Statement for the Family of John P. O'Neill in Response to U.S. Supreme Court's Refusal to Hear 9/11 Victims' Case Against Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Statement by Counsel for the Family of John P. O'Neill in Response to U.S. Supreme Court's Refusal to Hear 9/11 Victims' Case Against Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Others


/PRNewswire/ -- The following is a statement by Jerry S. Goldman of Anderson Kill & Olick, P.C., counsel to the family of John P. O'Neill, Sr.:

We are disappointed by today's decision by the United States Supreme Court to refuse to hear the case brought by the family of the late American hero, John P. O'Neill, on behalf of the victims of 9/11 against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and others. Federal Insurance Company, et al., v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, et al., No. 08-640 (6/29/09).

We are saddened to see that the Court declined to apply its traditional standards for accepting a case for review. We assume that it relied upon the arguments propounded by the Executive branch and the defendants to deny the 9/11 victims their day in Court against certain sovereign nations, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that we allege materially support terrorists.

We note, however, that there are still cases pending in the lower courts against other sovereign nations unaffected by the Supreme Court's ruling.

We note, too, that there are still cases pending against other defendants seeking to hold them accountable for their actions in assisting Al Qaeda.

At the Supreme Court, the Justice Department argued that the decision of the Second Circuit was only of limited impact on the other defendants in the case. We can only assume that the Justice Department will be consistent with the arguments that they propounded before the Supreme Court. Similarly, we are looking forward to their filings as to the scope of sovereign immunity.

We are optimistic that the lower courts will allow the rest of the lawsuit to proceed, as we believe that it is obvious that a United States court is the appropriate forum for hearing claims brought for harms suffered by individuals and businesses on American soil, whether against the terrorists who hijacked planes to wreak death and mass destruction, or against those, who provided the material support enabling terrorists to wreak death and destruction.

We look forward to finally proceeding with discovery and allowing justice to prevail.

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Justice Department's Brief Supporting Immunity for Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 9/11 Victim's Suit Misconstrues Sovereign Immunity

Justice Department's Brief Supporting Immunity for Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 9/11 Victim's Suit Misconstrues Sovereign Immunity and Jurisdictional Scope of the Anti-Terrorism Act, According to Family of 9/11 Victim and Former FBI Agent John O'Neill


/PRNewswire / -- The following is a statement from the family of John O'Neill, a retired Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigations with over 25 years of service in positions including head of the Counter-terrorism section and head of the National Security Division of the New York Field Office. Mr. O'Neill died on September 11, 2001, along with close to 3,000 other innocent individuals in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington D.C. At the time of his death, he was Director of Security at the World Trade Center and was killed assisting with the evacuation that ensured thousands made it to safety while sacrificing his own life so that others might live.

The O'Neill family stated:

Ten days ago, in a disturbing policy decision, the United States Government announced in a brief filed with the Supreme Court that it was supporting efforts by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and members of the Saudi royal family to defeat a long-running lawsuit seeking to hold them liable for the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The Department of Justice urged that the Court should not hear the matter, supporting the Kingdom's position that Saudi Arabia and the royal family have immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act and other common law immunities, and that the United States courts lack jurisdiction, and thus cannot be held responsible for supporting and financing terrorists and terrorist attacks directed at America. Today, our attorneys filed a brief in response requesting that the Supreme Court hold that the Government's arguments should be disregarded and the victims of 9/11 are entitled to their day in court.

John O'Neill spent his life fighting for justice on behalf of the American people. While serving his country at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, he demanded that the facts about terrorism be investigated with an open and impartial eye so that all perpetrators could be brought to justice in U.S. Courts. In his service as the head of the FBI's Counter-terrorism Section, with responsibilities for the Bureau's Al Qaeda investigations, and as head of the National Security Division of the New York Field Office, he fought for the truth when he investigated the Khobar Tower bombings, the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa, and the USS Cole bombing. During his career, John O'Neill was one of the few voices who relentlessly tried to bring attention to the true threat of Al Qaeda to this country. He was silenced on 9/11 when, literally days after retiring from the FBI, he began serving as Chief of Security for the World Trade Center and perished helping others escape from the World Trade Center. We are deeply saddened and dismayed that the government he served for more than 25 years has turned its back on justice and now seeks to deny us our day in court to pursue the truth about those who finance and support terrorism on America's soil and around the globe.

John O'Neill always felt that it was critical to display both to the American people and the world that terrorists can be brought to justice; that facts be shown to the citizens of the world; and that the American judicial system was the appropriate forum. He sought and fought for the truth where others were blinded.

The Justice Department's brief concedes that the Court of Appeals was wrong on the law, as our attorneys have alleged.

The Justice Department's brief acknowledges that there is a split in authority, which we have been informed is the basis for Supreme Court review.

The Justice Department's brief, however, propounds an erroneous construction of the sovereign immunity statute, in a feeble attempt to stop the case and protect the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and it cohorts from facing the truth of their actions. That is plain wrong in any case; in this particular situation it dishonors the memory of John O'Neill and the thousands of other victims. It is simply not what we would expect our Government to do.

The entire world recognized that Al Qaeda was a terrorist organization; yet certain countries, organizations, and individuals continued to support this known terrorist threat. Normally, actions have consequences; all those who materially support terrorism should be held accountable.

We trust that the rule of law will be followed, and that the Supreme Court will accept the case for review.

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Obama Administration Enables Saudi Princes to Escape Accountability for Material Support for 9/11 Terror Attacks, Families Charge

/PRNewswire / -- On the day that President Obama holds his first summit with Saudi Arabian King Abdullah in Riyadh, the 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism charged that recent actions by his administration would enable five of the king's closest relatives to escape accountability for their role in financing and materially supporting the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In response to the administration's action, the 9/11 families released allegations made in 2002 of the Saudi royal family's sponsorship and support of al Qaeda that the families believe have been ignored by the Obama Administration.

On May 29, the president's top lawyer before the Supreme Court, Solicitor General Elena Kagan, filed a brief arguing that it would be "unwarranted" for the Supreme Court to even hear cases brought by the 9/11 families charging that five Saudi princes knowingly and intentionally provided financial support to al Qaeda waging war on America. By urging the high court to not review lower court decisions dismissing these cases, the Obama Administration took the side of the Saudi princes over thousands of family members and survivors of the 9/11 attacks seeking justice and accountability in U.S. courts.

"This is a betrayal of our fundamentally American right to have our day in court," said Mike Low of Batesville, Ark., father of Sara Low, an American Airlines flight attendant who died on board Flight 11. "It sacrifices the principles of justice, transparency, accountability and security, which our case embodies, in order to accommodate the political pleadings of a foreign government on behalf of a handful of members of its monarchy."

"With this filing, the Obama Administration has constructed a convoluted legal rationale to justify a political decision to curry favor with the Saudi royal family," said Ron Motley, counsel for the 9/11 families. "However, the legal straw house they built collapses with the faintest breeze of logic, legal analysis, or common sense."

"We trust that the Supreme Court, after it has reviewed the law, the facts and the evidence, will reject the Obama Administration's wrongheaded opinion and agree to give the 9/11 family members the day in court they deserve," Motley said.

To illustrate both the injustice of the Obama Administration's Supreme Court filing and the many holes in its legal reasoning, the family members released the specific allegations they originally made on what the princes did to provide financial and material support to Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and the Taliban in the years and months leading up to September 11, 2001.

Specifically, the families' lawsuit alleges that:

-- Prince Turki al Faisal al Saud, past head of Saudi intelligence,
coordinated Saudi financial and logistical support for al Qaeda, Osama
bin Laden and the Taliban. In July 1998, Prince Turki brokered an
agreement between these parties in which the Saudis provided al Qaeda
and the Taliban with generous financial assistance in exchange for a
pledge by bin Laden and the Taliban that al Qaeda would not attack the
Saudi royal family.(1)
-- Prince Mohamed al Faisal al Saud headed the Islamic bank Dar al Maal
al Islami, which provided global financial services and financing to
al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.(2)
-- Prince Sultan Bin Abdulaziz al Saud, whose responsibilities included
overseeing Islamic charitable funding in Saudi Arabia, funded al Qaeda
through personal contributions to Islamic charities known to support
bin Laden and his terrorist organization.(3)
-- Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz al Saud, who has long supported Palestinian
suicide bombers, provided pay-off money to al Qaeda. His oversight of
al Qaeda front charity al Haramain allowed it to support bin Laden and
al Qaeda unabated.(4)

-- Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz al Saud has a long history of funding
Islamic extremists through his work as chairman of the General
Donation Committee for Afghanistan. In this capacity, Prince Salman
made substantial personal contributions to al Qaeda front charities
with the full knowledge the charities were misappropriating funds and
involved in terrorist activities.(5)

(More detailed allegations are contained in the attached chart.)


In the face of these allegations, Motley charged that the legal flaws in the Obama Administration's filing are all the more egregious.

For example, the solicitor general concedes that the Saudi princes as individual officials are not entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). But even though the government has never previously expressed any notion of offering the Saudi princes any immunity for their alleged terrorist involvement, the administration urges that the Supreme Court should nonetheless treat the Princes as though they are immune anyway because of vague "non-statutory principles articulated by the Executive." This makes clear the Obama Administration is more concerned with the foreign relations consequences of making the Saudi princes answer for their donations to al Qaeda than with allowing the 9/11 families their fair day in court to address the princes' accountability for their conduct.

Moreover, even if the Saudi princes knowingly and intentionally gave money to al Qaeda waging war on America, the solicitor general argued that does not qualify for the "domestic tort exception" to sovereign immunity because the Saudi Princes did not give their money "within the United States." The solicitor general says it is not enough if the Saudis gave money to al Qaeda only from abroad. According to the solicitor general's argument, in order to strip immunity from the Saudi princes, "the foreign state's act or omission -- not that of any third party -- must occur in the United States."

The solicitor general further argues that U.S. courts cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the Saudi Princes who gave money to al Qaeda because they were not "primary wrongdoer[s]" -- according to the solicitor general -- as they engaged in only "indirect funding of al Qaeda." But excusing the princes as not "primary wrongdoers" is in direct conflict with a recent Seventh Circuit ruling in the terror litigation context.(6) In this case, known as Boim v. Holy Land Foundation, the Seventh Circuit held that all those who donate money to known terrorist groups are themselves engaging in terrorism -- and thus "primary violators" subject to "primary liability" under the Anti-Terrorism Act section 2333. Boim further cautioned: "Nor should donors to terrorism be able to escape liability because terrorists and their supporters launder donations through a chain of intermediate organizations. Donor A gives to innocent-appearing organization B which gives to innocent-appearing organization C which gives to Hamas. As long as A either knows or is reckless in failing to discover that donations to B end up with Hamas, A is liable."(7)

The administration filing's bottom line, according to Motley, is that an official of any foreign country not "designated as a state sponsor of terrorism" is immune from suit as long as that official gave money "outside the United States" to terrorists -- even where those terrorists are waging a declared war causing massive death and destruction inside the United States. "This is an absurd misinterpretation of the law that, if carried to its logical extreme, could let all of al Qaeda's bankrollers off the hook," Motley charged. "If allowed to stand as the Obama administration's brief urges, the lower court's decision would allow terrorist financiers to stand at the borders of our nation providing all means of terrorist support, while snubbing their noses at our time honored judicial system of accountability."

The plaintiffs further allege that "Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda have publicly and proudly proclaimed direct responsibility for [prior] multiple atrocities in furtherance of international terrorism. Direct attacks on Americans intensified in 1998 after Osama bin Laden issued this 'fatwa,' stating: 'We -- with God's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.'"(8)

Motley said he was especially shocked that the solicitor general justified not holding foreign officials who give money to the 9/11 terrorists to account in an American court by repeating the same error made by the late District Judge Richard Conway Casey and the Second Circuit when they ruled plaintiffs' well-pleaded allegations were "inadequa[te]" and "conclusory" to show the Princes knew that they were funneling money to al Qaeda. "This is utter nonsense," Motley said, noting the specific detail of the allegations made, all of which allegedly show that the princes gave money to al Qaeda waging declared jihad on America, knowing that al Qaeda was targeting death and destruction on America.(9)

"What the solicitor general and the lower courts ignore is that the plaintiffs brought this suit to hold the defendants -- a handful of royals, other financiers, bin Laden, al Qaeda, and certain charities, banks and other organizations they own and control -- responsible for this insidious form of terrorism which cloaks itself behind the face of royal state titles and legitimacy," Motley said.

Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network do not exist in a vacuum, he explained. They could not plan, train and act on such a massive scale without significant financial power, coordination and backing.(10)

Select sources reporting Saudi Arabia is an important funding source for Islamic Extremism:

-- United States Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
United States Congress House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities
before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: Report
of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Together with Additional
Views.
-- Terrorist Financing. Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by
the Council on Foreign Relations, October 2002. Available at
www.cfr.org/pdf/Terrorist_Financing_TF.pdf and Update on the Global
Campaign Against Terrorist Financing. Second Report of an Independent
Task Force on Terrorist Financing Sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations, June 15, 2004. See
www.cfr.org/pdf/Revised_Terrorist_Financing.pdf.
-- Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of
the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives One
Hundred Eighth Congress Second Session March 24, 2004 Serial No.
108-109.
-- International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies' Efforts to
Address Islamic Extremism, GAO-05-852 (Washington: D.C.: United States
Government Accountability Office, Sept. 2005).
-- Iraq Study Group (U.S.), et al. The Iraq Study Group Report. 1st
authorized ed. New York: Vintage Books, 2006.
-- Testimony of Lee S. Wolosky Partner, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs September
18, 2007.
-- U.S. State Department 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report.
-- Testimony of U.S. Department of the Treasury Undersecretary for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart A. Levey before the Senate
Finance Committee, April 1, 2008.

-- H. R. 1288 Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2009 111th Congress 1st
Session.





Allegations that the Saudi Princes Named as Defendants
Provided Financial and Material Support to al Qaeda

Source: Third Amended Complaint, Thomas E. Burnett, Sr., et al. vs. Al
Baraka Investment & Development Corporation, et al., Case No. 03-CV-9849
(GBD) as consolidated in In Re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,
Case No. 03-MDL-1570 (GBD), paragraphs 340, 344-346, 348-350.
This can be viewed at www.motleyrice.com/terrorism/relevant_documents.asp.

TAC Paragraph, Specific Allegation
Page
97-99, pp. Prince Mohamed al Faisal al Saud was the CEO of the
244-245; 342, Islamic bank Dar al Maal al Islami ("DMI") which
p. 309; 364, provided financing and financial services to al Qaeda
p. 315

340, p. 309 Prince Turki al Faisal al Saud had an ongoing
relationship with Osama bin Laden from the time that
they first met in Islamabad, Pakistan at the Saudi
embassy, during the Soviet Union's occupation of
Afghanistan.

342, p. 309-310 Prince Abdullah al Faisal bin Abdulaziz al Saud,
Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz al Saud and Prince Salman
bin Abdul Aziz al Saud

have provided material support to Osama bin Laden and
al Qaeda. They also aided, abetted and materially
sponsored OBL and al Qaeda

344, p. 310 Prince Turki, who headed the Royal Families
intelligence service for 25 years and met personally
with Osama bin Laden at least 5 times, guided the
Saudi intelligence service to provide substantial
financial and material support to the Taliban in or
about 1995.

345, p. 310 Al Qaeda financier Mohammed Zouaydi had close
financial ties to Prince Turki and Prince Mohammed al
Faisal.

346, pp. 310-311 According to a senior Taliban official, Prince Turki
was the facilitator of money transfers to the Taliban
and al Qaeda.

347. p. 311 In 1996, a group of Saudi princes met with prominent
Saudi businessmen in Paris and agreed to continue
financially contributing and otherwise supporting
Osama bin Laden's terrorist network.

348, p. 311 In July of 1998, a meeting occurred in Kandahar,
Afghanistan that led to an agreement between certain
Saudis and the Taliban. The participants were Prince
Turki, the Taliban leaders, and senior Pakistani
intelligence officers of the ISI and representatives
of Osama bin Laden. The agreement reached stipulated
that Osama bin Laden and his followers would not use
the infrastructure in Afghanistan to subvert the
royal families' control of Saudi government. In
return, the Saudis would make sure that no demands
for the extradition of terrorist individuals, such as
Osama bin Laden, and/or for the closure of terrorist
facilities and camps. Prince Turki also promised to
provide oil and generous financial assistance to both
the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. After the
meeting, 400 new pick-up trucks arrived in Kandahar
for the Taliban, still bearing Dubai license plates.

349, p. 311 Prince Turki was instrumental in arranging a meeting
in Kandahar between Iraqi senior intelligence
operative, the Ambassador to Turkey Faruq al-Hijazi,
and Osama bin Laden, in December of 1998.

350, p. 311 Saudi Intelligence, directed by Prince Turki until
August 2001, served as a facilitator of Osama bin
Laden's network of charities, foundations, and other
funding sources.

354, p. 312 Prince Sultan has been involved in the sponsorship of
international terrorism through the IIRO and other
Saudi-funded charities.

357-358. p. 313 King Fahd set up a Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs,
headed by his brother Prince Sultan to centralize,
supervise and review aid requests from Islamic
groups. This council was established to control the
charity financing and look into ways of distributing
donations to eligible Muslim groups. Consequently, as
Chairman of the Supreme Council, Prince Sultan could
not have ignored the ultimate destinations of
charitable funding, and could not have overlooked the
role of the Saudi charitable entities identified
herein in financing the al Qaeda terrorist
organization.

359, pp. 313-314 Despite that responsibility and knowledge, Prince
Sultan personally funded several Islamic charities
over the years that sponsor, aid, abet or materially
support Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda: the
International Islamic Relief Organization (and its
financial fund Sanabel el-Khair), al-Haramain, Muslim
World League, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth.
Despite that responsibility and knowledge, Prince
Sultan personally funded several Islamic charities
over the years that sponsor, aid, abet or materially
support Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda: the
International Islamic Relief Organization (and its
financial fund Sanabel el-Khair), al-Haramain, Muslim
World League, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth.

360, p. 314 Prince Sultan's role in the IIRO's financing is of
significance. Since the IIRO's creation in 1978,
Prince Sultan participated by donations and various
gifts to the charity. In 1994 alone, he donated
$266,652 to the Islamic International Relief
Organization. Since 1994, the amount funneled by
Prince Sultan into IIRO is reported to be $2,399,868.
Prince Sultan's role in directly contributing to and
in the oversight of IIRO evidences his material
sponsorship, aiding and abetting of international
terrorism. Prince Sultan maintains close relations
with the IIRO organization headquarters and knew or
should have known these assets were being diverted to
al Qaeda.

361-362, p. 314 Prince Sultan is also a regular donator to the World
Assembly of Muslim Youth ( "WAMY"). WAMY was founded
in 1972 in a Saudi effort to prevent the "corrupting"
ideas of the western world influencing young Muslims.
With official backing it grew to embrace 450 youth
and student organizations with 34 offices worldwide.
WAMY has been officially identified as a "suspected
terrorist organization" by the FBI since 1996 and has
been the subject of numerous governmental
investigations for terrorist activities.

370-371, p. 317; Prince Abdullah al Faisal is the majority owner of
372-373, p. 317 Alfaisaliah Group, also known as al Faisal Group
Holding Co. According to FBI records 9/11 hijacker
Hani Saleh H. Hanjour, his brother Abdulrahman Saleh
Hanjour, living in Tucson, Arizona, and 9/11 suspect
Abdal Monem Zelitny had registered addresses in Taif,
Saudi Arabia that correspond with an Alfaisaliah
Group branch office.

374-375, p. 317 Prince Abdullah al Faisal's accountant in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia was Defendant Muhammed Galeb Kalaje
Zouaydi, convicted in Spain for financing al Qaeda
operations in Europe. Zouaydi set up Spanish
companies established during the time he was staying
in Saudi Arabia and working for Prince Abdullah al
Faisal, between 1996 and 2000. Zouaydi laundered
Saudi money through Spain to an al Qaeda cell in
Germany. Eye witnesses place Zouaydi in Prince
Abdullah al Faisal's office in Jeddah.

381, p. 319 Prince Naif, who has a long history of supported for
Palestinian suicide martyrs and Palestinian terrorist
organizations, has provided material support to al
Qaeda, including providing monetary payoffs to al
Qaeda.

382, p. 319 Prince Naif, who is the Saudi Minister of Interior and
heads the Saudi Committee for Relief to Afghans,
supervised the activities of Defendant charity Al
Haramain Foundation, which materially supported al
Qaeda and the Taliban.

392-399, pp. In 1993, Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz al Saud founded
321-323 Saudi High Commission charity. The charity's Bosnian
offices were found to have sponsored al Qaeda members
and materially supported al Qaeda.

400, pp. 323-324 Prince Salman has a history of funding Islamic
extremism. In 1980, Prince Salman was named Chairman
of the General Donation Committee for Afghanistan.

401, p. 324 In 1999, Prince Salman made a donation of $400,000
during a fund-raising event organized for Bosnia
Herzegovina and Chechnya by Defendants International
Islamic Relief Organization, World Assembly of Muslim
Youths, and Al-Haramain Foundation.

404-407, Despite evidence of misappropriation of charitable
pp.324-325 funds by directors of the Saudi High Commissions
Bosnian chapter, Prince Salman knowingly failed to
take appropriate action regarding the management and
distribution of funds.


(1)Third Amended Complaint, Thomas E. Burnett, Sr., et al. vs. Al Baraka Investment & Development Corporation, et al., Case No. 03-CV-9849 (GBD) as consolidated in In Re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, Case No. 03-MDL-1570 (GBD), paragraphs 340, 344-346, 348-350. This can be viewed at www.motleyrice.com/terrorism/relevant_documents.asp.

(2)TAC paragraphs 97-99, 242, 244-245, 364.
(3)TAC paragraphs 354, 357-362.
(4)TAC paragraphs 342, 381-382.
(5)TAC paragraphs 392-401, 404-407.
(6)See Boim v. Holy Land Found., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
(7)Id. at 701-702.
(8)TAC, p. 12.
(9)TAC.
(10)TAC.

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U.S. Praises Morocco's 'Comprehensive Counterterrorism Approach' and 'International Cooperation' to Combat Rising al-Qaeda Threat in Sahara

/PRNewswire / -- The following is being released by the Moroccan American Center for Policy:

Yesterday, the U.S. State Department praised the Kingdom of Morocco's "comprehensive counterterrorism approach" as it works with the U.S. and its regional and international partners to combat the growing transnational threat from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other terrorist groups.

"The Government of Morocco, and frequently the King himself, regularly and strongly condemned terrorist acts, wherever they occurred," said the annual report to Congress submitted by the State Dept.'s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. "The Moroccan government pursued a comprehensive counterterrorism approach that, building on popular rejection of terrorism, emphasizes neutralizing existing terrorist cells through traditional law enforcement and preemptive security measures, and prevented terrorist recruitment through comprehensive counter-radicalization policies."

The report detailed the success Morocco has seen from its multi-faceted strategy and social reforms to combat terrorism, which goes far beyond "traditional security measures." Specifically, the report highlighted Morocco's $1.2 billion National Human Development Initiative "aimed at ameliorating the socio-economic factors that terrorists exploit" as well as the official sanction of mourchidates, or female spiritual guides, whose role is to promote moderation and religious tolerance in mosques across the Kingdom and in Moroccan immigrant communities abroad.

The report also stressed that a key to Morocco's counterterrorism efforts has been "its emphasis on international cooperation" which has helped Moroccan authorities "disrupt plots to attack Moroccan, U.S. and other Western-affiliated targets, and aggressively investigat[e] numerous individuals associated with international terrorist groups."

"For more than 220 years, Morocco and the United States have continuously worked together to combat security threats to both countries - from piracy on the high seas in the late 1700's to today's increasing terrorist challenge in the Sahara and elsewhere," said Robert M. Holley, executive director of the Moroccan American Center for Policy. "The U.S. and Morocco must work even more closely with its international partners on these critical issues to protect and advance the lives of millions in North Africa, as well as the broader international community."

Yesterday's State Department report underscores many of the same concerns raised in recent weeks by 233 Members of Congress in a letter to President Barack Obama, which states that "[v]ital U.S. interests in North Africa are increasingly challenged by growing regional instability." The Members - representing a bipartisan majority of the House of Representatives as well as the highest ranking members of the Democratic and Republican leadership - called on President Obama to strengthen U.S. support for Morocco's compromise autonomy proposal to peacefully resolve the Western Sahara conflict, which they consider to be the "single greatest obstacle impeding the security cooperation necessary to combat this transnational threat."

In March, a special report, "Why the Maghreb Matters," released by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and the Conflict Management Program at Johns Hopkins University, presented the recommendations of a distinguished panel including former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Ret. General Wesley Clark and former Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat. The panel noted the 400% spike in terrorist attacks in the region since 9/11 and advocated increased U.S. engagement with Morocco and other North Africa nations to protect American security interests and to thwart a growing peril from al-Qaeda terrorists in the Sahara.

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U.S. Wrong on Somalia; Center Will Soon Appoint an Attorney for Somali Pirate in U.S. Custody

/PRNewswire / -- The Somali Justice Advocacy Center expresses a great deal of concern over the current U.S. policy in effect towards Somalia. The current geopolitical situation involving U.S. policy towards Somalia is one of abandonment.

The consequences of the absence of the Wilsonian idealism which American policy has stood for, and the continuation of a policy of non-engagement has clearly become catastrophic. This failed U.S. policy has led to factions that proliferate and strive while Al Qaeda is now shifting and controlling most of the southern Somalia.

Somali Justice Advocacy Center furthermore expresses a concern over recent U.S. and French deadly military action against the pirates. This endangered the lives of many other hostages in Somalia. The Center is involved in talks to release a Nigerian ship with ten crewmen who are now hostages in Somalia.

The pirates in Somalia are currently holding more than 200 hostages along the coastline and more on their ships.

Somali Justice Advocacy Center appeals to the international community to pay close attention to the plight of the Somali people and help the reinstitution of minimum law and order in the country. Somali Justice Advocacy Center will soon appoint a lawyer to the surviving pirate now in U.S. custody. The Center finds the idea of persecuting a Somali pirate in U.S. courts odd and illegal in strict accordance with international law. The Center furthermore believes the agreement between U.S. and Kenya to persecute Somali pirates in the Kenyan judicial system should be null and void. The Center asks the U.S. to hand over the Somali pirate to the Puntland administration in Somalia.

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Former U.S. Navy Member Abu-Jihaad Sentenced for Disclosing Classified Info‏

Nora R. Dannehy, Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Connecticut, and other federal officials announced that Hassan Abu-Jihaad, formerly known as Paul R. Hall, 33, of Phoenix, Arizona, was sentenced today by U.S. District Judge Mark R. Kravitz in New Haven to 120 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, for disclosing previously classified information relating to the national defense.

“This defendant provided classified information to others with the understanding that it could be used to endanger the lives of hundreds of members of the United States Navy, and we are pleased that the court imposed the maximum prison term allowed under the law,” Acting U.S. Attorney Dannehy stated. “I want to acknowledge the efforts of all the agents, analysts and prosecutors involved in this matter who have worked diligently over the course of several years to bring this defendant to justice.”

According to the evidence provided at trial, in 2001, four or five months after the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole, Abu-Jihaad provided classified information regarding the movements of a United States Navy battle group, which was charged with enforcing sanctions against the Taliban and engaging in missions against Al Qaeda, to Azzam Publications, a London-based organization that is alleged to have provided material support and resources to persons engaged in acts of terrorism through the creation and use of various internet web sites, e-mail communications, and other means, including www.azzam.com.

Between approximately February 2000 and the end of 2001, the web site http://www.azzam.comwww.azzam.com was hosted on the computer web servers of a web hosting company located in Trumbull, Connecticut. At the time the classified information was disclosed to Azzam Publications, Abu-Jihaad was an enlistee in the United States Navy on active duty in the Middle East and was stationed aboard the U.S.S. Benfold, one of the ships in the battle group whose movements were disclosed.

Evidence presented at trial indicated that, in December 2003, British law enforcement officers recovered a computer floppy disk in a residence of one of the operators of Azzam Publications. Forensic analysis of the disk disclosed a password-protected Microsoft Word document setting forth previously classified information regarding the upcoming movements of a U.S. Naval battle group as it was to transit from San Diego to its deployment in the Persian Gulf in 2001. The document went on to discuss the battle group’s perceived vulnerability to terrorist attack.

According to the evidence at trial, subsequent investigation uncovered several email exchanges from late 2000 to late 2001 between members of Azzam Publications and Abu-Jihaad, including discussions regarding videos Abu-Jihaad ordered from Azzam Publications that promoted violent jihad and extolled the virtues of martyrdom; a small donation of money Abu-Jihaad made to Azzam Publications; and whether it was “safe” to send materials to Abu-Jihaad at his military address onboard the U.S.S. Benfold.

In another email exchange with Azzam Publications, Abu-Jihaad described a recent force protection briefing given aboard his ship, voiced enmity toward America, praised Usama bin Laden and the mujahideen, praised the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole – which Abu-Jihaad described as a “martyrdom operation,” – and advised the members of Azzam Publications that such tactics were working and taking their toll. The email response from Azzam Publications encouraged Abu-Jihaad to “keep up... the psychological warefare [sic].”

The evidence at trial also indicated that Abu-Jihaad’s contact information – namely, his Navy email account – was among the few saved in an Azzam Publications online address book.

The evidence at trial included the testimony of six Navy witnesses indicating, among other things, that as a Signalman in the Navigation Division of the U.S.S. Benfold during the 2001 deployment, Abu-Jihaad had access to certain classified information, including advance knowledge of the battle group’s movements.

The evidence at trial also included court-authorized wiretap recordings, during which Abu-Jihaad used coded conversation to refer to jihad; admonished others not to speak openly about jihad over the phone or on the Internet because it was “tapped”; and discussed having conversations with associates using a shredder and after frisking them for electronic components.

The calls played for the jury also included Abu-Jihaad’s use of the terms “hot meals” and “cold meals” in reference to his current and former ability, respectively, to provide inside information or intelligence about potential U.S. military targets. Abu-Jihaad told an associate that he “hadn’t been on that job in X amount of years . . . to see . . . what the fresh meal is,” and in 2006, told another associate that he had not “been in the field of making meals” for more than four years. The evidence established that Abu-Jihaad had left the U.S. Navy in 2002.

On March 5, 2008, a federal jury in New Haven found Abu-Jihaad guilty of one count of providing material support of terrorism, and one count disclosing previously classified information relating to the national defense. On March 4, 2009, Judge Kravitz partially granted a defense motion for a judgment of acquittal on the material support of terrorism charge. The charge of disclosing previously classified information relating to the national defense carries a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years.

Acting U.S. Attorney Dannehy commended the substantial efforts and cooperation of the several federal law enforcement agencies involved in the investigation including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); the Federal Bureau of Investigation in New Haven, Phoenix and Chicago; the United States Attorney’s Offices in Phoenix and Chicago; the Naval Criminal Investigative Service; the Defense Criminal Investigative Service; and the Internal Revenue Service’ Electronic Crimes Program.

Acting U.S. Attorney Dannehy also praised the substantial efforts of law enforcement authorities from the Metropolitan Police Service’s Counter-Terrorism Command within New Scotland Yard, whose efforts and assistance have been essential in the investigation of this matter.

This case is being pursued by a Task Force out of Connecticut consisting of law enforcement officers from the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Internal Revenue Service’s Electronic Crimes Program; the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

The case is being prosecuted by a team of federal prosecutors including Assistant United States Attorneys Stephen Reynolds and William Nardini from the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut, Trial Attorney Alexis Collins from the Counter-Terrorism Section of the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Security Division in Washington and Trial Attorney Rick Green from the Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section of the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, with the assistance of Paralegal Specialist David Heath.

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Gates: U.S. Won't Allow Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan

As the United States reviews its strategy in Afghanistan, one thing is certain: The United States won't let the Taliban threaten the Afghan government and re-establish safe havens there, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said on National Public Radio yesterday.

"I would say that at a minimum, the mission is to prevent the Taliban from retaking power against the democratically elected government in Afghanistan and thus turning Afghanistan potentially again into a haven for alQaida and other extremist groups," Gates said.

The secretary conceded that the situation in Afghanistan "began to go downhill again" in 2005 and 2006. That's when the Taliban started taking advantage of safe havens on the Pakistani side of the Pakistan-Afghan border and began "to re-infiltrate into Afghanistan and create security problems."

The decision to send an additional 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan and reassess the strategy there focuses on this challenge. "We've really just been responding to that," Gates said. "Clearly, we all still have our work cut out for us."

Although NATO is committing additional troops to provide security for the August elections, the secretary said he was not sure if they'd remain for any prolonged period.

"The allies have sent all the troops that they have committed to send. It hasn't been that they have failed to follow through on their commitments," he said.

The problem is that "the need is greater than the commitments that have been made to this point," he said. "And so we would like more help."

But the biggest shortfall, he said, isn't on the military side. "Really, where we need the help is on the civilian side, whether it's agricultural specialists or people who can help with governance, economic development and so on," he said.

Gates reiterated the need for achievable near- and mid-term goals in Afghanistan, with benchmarks to assess the effectiveness of the mission there. These, he said, will "measure whether we are actually making progress and getting to a better place in Afghanistan in terms of security, in terms of credibility of the government" and how the U.S.-Afghan partnership is working.

These, he said, aren't the same goals the United States hopes to see in 10, 20 or 30 years -- "a completely democratic, fully economically developed ally."

He referred to this state as "Valhalla," a mythical utopian state, but conceded, "I think that's a little ways in the distance."

Turning to Iraq, Gates said he's "on the same page" with President Barack Obama regarding the drawdown of U.S. troops there. "The fact is that if there is no new agreement with the Iraqis, there will be zero U.S. troops in Iraq after the end of 2011," he said.

But Gates conceded that the United States may maintain a "very modest-sized presence" after the status-of-forces agreement expires in December 2011 to provide training, equipment assistance and intelligence support. That would happen, he said, only if the Iraqis request it, and if Obama approves the request.

As the discussion turned to intelligence, Gates defended the work of intelligence professionals who have become the targets of frequent pot-shots. "They really do a very good job of telling you what's going on right now around the world," he said. "But forecasting – the truth of the matter is they're not a lot better than anybody else. And I think policymakers need to understand that."

Gates noted the challenge of getting a true picture of what's taking place in Iran and other potential hot spots around the world.

"Obviously, some targets are much more difficult than others," he said. Iran, North Korea and Cuba are all very difficult targets.

"The truth of the matter is, for decades our intelligence hasn't been terrific on some of these places," Gates said. "I think there's a lot of effort to try and make it better. But there's still a lot of uncertainty out there."

By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

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FBI Perspective on Threats from Somalia

Philip Mudd
Associate Executive Assistant Director, National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

March 11, 2009

Good morning Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here today. Thank you for the opportunity to provide the FBI’s perspective on the issue of threats from Somalia and their effect on the security of the United States. I will also discuss our assessment of why a number of individuals have left the United States to train or fight in Somalia, and how the FBI is working with our law enforcement and intelligence partners to respond to the threat.

Somalia Overview

Somalia continues to be wracked by instability and, despite efforts to bring some measure of peace and stability to that country, is still plagued by conflict among various competing factions. The rise of violent extremist Islamist elements—like the al-Shabaab militia, which has made significant gains in the aftermath of the Ethiopian invasion in late 2006—has made the security environment there even more unsettled. Al-Shabaab is one of the most significant forces on the ground in Somalia and has conducted a range of operations against a number of different targets inside the country. While the Ethiopian government withdrew all combat forces in mid-January, al-Shabaab has conducted follow-on attacks against African Union peacekeeping troops, as well as international aide workers. Al-Shabaab’s use of tactics such as suicide bombings, kidnappings, beheadings, and murders only serves to burnish its reputation for violence.

Beyond the threat al-Shabaab poses in Somalia, its connections to other extremists in the region and beyond add to concern over its activities. Al-Shabaab has links to the al Qaeda in East Africa network—including individuals responsible for the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania—and maintains ties with al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Al Qaeda’s focus on Somalia is in part reflected in its propaganda: top al Qaeda advisor Ayman al-Zawahiri, for example, proclaimed in a February 2009 statement that gains made by al-Shabaab in Somalia were “a step on the path of victory of Islam.” Such propaganda suggests al Qaeda leaders see Somalia as a potential recruiting, training, or staging ground for anti-U.S. or Western operations in the region, or even more disturbing, around the globe.

Dynamics in the United States

An estimated two million to three million Somalis live outside of Somalia or the Horn of Africa, and the ethnic Somali community in the United States is estimated to range from 150,000 to 200,000. However, high rates of illegal immigration, widespread identity and documentation fraud, and a cultural reluctance to share personal information with census takers has prevented an accurate count of the ethnic Somali population inside the United States. Ethnic Somalis began arriving in Minneapolis, Minnesota in the mid-1990s on the heels of a broader resettlement program, and the area is now home to the single largest population of ethnic Somalis in the United States. Other cities with reported large concentrations of ethnic Somalis include Columbus, Ohio; Seattle, Washington; Washington, D.C.; San Diego, California; and Atlanta, Georgia.

Since late 2006, we have seen several individuals from the United States—many with ethnic ties to Somalia and some without such connections—travel to Somalia to train or fight on behalf of al-Shabaab. The number of individuals we believe have departed for Somalia is comparatively larger than the number of individuals who have left the United States for other conflict zones around the world over the past few years. And we have seen more individuals leave from the Minneapolis area than from any other part of the country.

In Minneapolis, we believe there has been an active and deliberate attempt to recruit individuals—all of whom are young men, some only in their late teens—to travel to Somalia to fight or train on behalf of al-Shabaab. We assess that for the majority of these individuals, the primary motivation for such travel was to defend their place of birth from the Ethiopian invasion, although an appeal was also made based on their shared Islamic identity. A range of socio-economic conditions—such as violent youth crime and gang subcultures, and tensions over cultural integration—may have also played some role in the recruitment process. We also note that several of the travelers from Minneapolis came from single-parent households, potentially making them more susceptible to recruitment from charismatic male authority figures.

While there are no current indicators that any of the individuals who traveled to Somalia have been selected, trained, or tasked by al-Shabaab or other extremists to conduct attacks inside the United States, we remain concerned about this possibility and that it might be exploited in the future if other U.S. persons travel to Somalia for similar purpos es. The fact that one of the Minneapolis youths participated in a suicide attack in northern Somalia in late October 2008—which we believe is the first instance of a U.S. citizen participating in a suicide attack anywhere—has only added to concern over the possibility that individuals may engage in terrorist activity upon their return to the United States.

Comparison to the United Kingdom

Much has been written about the circumstances of many South Asians in the United Kingdom, and how a variety of factors has contributed to an environment in which hundreds of individuals became involved in extremist activity there and in South Asia. Among the factors having some impact on South Asian communities in the United Kingdom are social and cultural alienation, demographic patterns, underemployment or unemployment, youth and gang-related violence, the existence of active extremist recruitment and facilitation networks, and natural access to an active conflict zone based on family or ethnic connections.

For the overwhelming majority of immigrant Muslim-American communities inside the United States, this U.K. environment stands in sharp contrast. As recent public opinion polls—such as the May 2007 Pew Poll and recent Gallup Poll—have shown, Muslim-Americans are for the most part well-integrated, and they achieve statistically higher levels of economic and educational achievement than most other minority groups within the United States. While poll results show that grievances do exist for Muslim-Americans, the vast majority do not condone the use of violence to provide any redress.

Despite the events in Minneapolis and examples of U.S. persons from other parts of the country who have traveled to Somalia for training or fighting, we do not believe that Somali communities here face the same challenges as similar South Asian communities in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, some of the same factors that have contributed to the high level of extremist activity in the South Asian U.K. environment are evident in some Somali communities inside the United States, which indicates the need for heightened outreach and engagement in order to prevent these from manifesting into direct threats to the Homeland.

Outreach and Engagement

Since the 9/11 attacks, the FBI has developed an extensive outreach program to Muslim, South Asian, and Sikh communities to develop trust, address concerns, and dispel myths in those communities about the FBI and the U.S. government. In the wake of developments in Minneapolis, the FBI initiated a pilot program focused on enhancing outreach and engagement activities with select field offices that were dealing with some aspect of the Somalia traveler issue. This program is still in the proof-of-concept phase, but is expected to provide multiple benefits for the FBI and the Somali communities within the purview of the select field offices.

Partnership with State and Local Government

The FBI has long partnered with state and local law enforcement. In the counterterrorism domain, that partnership has been sustained through more than 25 years of involvement in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) throughout the country. While the FBI is the lead federal agency for terrorism investigations inside the United States, we recognize the vast resources, experience, and insight our state and local law enforcement partners have within the areas in which our field offices and satellite offices reside. One such example includes a partnership among our Minneapolis Field Office and local law enforcement, educators, and social service agency representatives to discuss issues of interest and concern regarding the Somali community there.

We are leveraging our relationships with state and local law enforcement in various field offices beyond the traditional JTTF structure to enhance our understanding or insight into the Somalia issue and its possible impact on the United States, including fostering new initiatives with units involved in traditional criminal or gang programs.

Intelligence Community Collaboration

The FBI continues to work with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community to assess, evaluate, monitor, and—if required—disrupt, any potential threats based on activity related to extremism in Somalia. FBI analysts work closely with their counterparts at the Department of Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Nation al Counterterrorism Center to evaluate events in Somalia and how they might affect the United States. Operationally, FBI agents work with a range of counterparts to develop programs to collect intelligence and disrupt any possible threats relating to individuals who have traveled to Somalia for extremist activity, or wish to travel in the future. Information regarding analysis and operations is shared routinely and continuously, and up to the highest levels of decision-makers in various agencies.

Threat to the Homeland

On balance, we are concerned about the recruitment of individuals from the United States to Somalia and their involvement in training or fighting there. While there are likely a variety of motivations affecting such individuals, it remains unclear whether the allure of Somalia as an active conflict zone has diminished in the wake of Ethiopia’s withdrawal—thereby removing a primary grievance based on nationalism—or whether it will continue to attract individuals from the West who see Somalia as a permissive environment given ongoing instability.

While al-Shabaab’s foothold in Somalia remains tenuous, it has secured a number of gains in recent months, and its proclivity for extreme violence remains a hallmark. Most worrisome are links between al-Shabaab and al Qaeda associates in the region and elsewhere, and the degree to which Somalia will become another safe haven from which to train, recruit, and then deploy Westerners already there for attacks against their home countries is an open question. Currently, there are no clear indicators that this is occurring, but there are several gaps in our understanding of events there that preclude a more robust understanding of the nature and severity of the threat to the West or United States.

Conclusion

Today, the FBI continues to collect intelligence and assess any potential threats to the United States based on activity related to extremism in Somalia. We are working closely with our U.S. Intelligence Community and law enforcement counterparts to analyze the vulnerability of the United States to such an attack. We will build on these relationships as we continue efforts to stay ahead of the threats and protect our Homeland.

We thank the Committee for its continued support of the FBI and its national security mission. And we look forward to continuing to work with you to protect our nation and its citizens.

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Muslim Publics Oppose Al Qaeda's Terrorism, But Agree With Its Goal of Driving U.S. Forces Out

/PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- A study of public opinion in predominantly Muslim countries reveals that very large majorities continue to renounce the use of attacks on civilians as a means of pursuing political goals. People in majority-Muslim countries express mixed feelings about al Qaeda and other Islamist groups that use violence, however, perhaps due to a combination of support for al Qaeda's goals and disapproval of its terrorist methods.

Large majorities support allowing Islamist groups to organize parties and participate in democratic elections. In some majority-Muslim countries, Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are forbidden from participating in elections.

Steven Kull, director of WorldPublicOpinion.org, comments, "The U.S. faces a conundrum. U.S. efforts to fight terrorism with an expanded military presence in Muslim countries appear to have elicited a backlash and to have bred some sympathy for al Qaeda, even as most reject its methods."

The survey is part of an ongoing study of Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia, with additional polling in Turkey, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Azerbaijan, and Nigeria. It was conducted July through September, 2008 by WorldPublicOpinion.org with support from the START Consortium at the University of Maryland. Margins of error range from +/- 3 to 4 percent.

In nearly all nations polled more than seven in 10 say they disapprove of attacks on American civilians. "Bombings and assassinations that are carried out to achieve political or religious goals" are rejected as "not justified at all" by large majorities ranging from 67 to 89 percent. There is a growing belief that attacks on civilians are ineffective, with approximately half now saying that such attacks are hardly ever effective.

Asked specifically about the U.S. naval forces based in the Persian Gulf, there is widespread opposition across the Muslim world. Opposition is largest in Egypt (91%) and among the Palestinians (90%), but opposition is also large in America's NATO ally Turkey (77%).

Views of al Qaeda are complex. Majorities agree with nearly all of al Qaeda's goals to change U.S. behavior in the Muslim world, to promote Islamist governance, and to preserve and affirm Islamic identity. However only minorities say they approve of al Qaeda's attacks on Americans.

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Fox News: Al Qaeda Claims to Have Taken 2 U.N. Diplomats, 4 Tourists Hostage

Al Qaeda's North Africa branch claimed Wednesday it is holding hostage a senior U.N. peace envoy, his aide and four tourists kidnapped in the Sahara Desert in recent weeks......
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,495525,00.html


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