Iranian Man and His Company Charged in International Scheme to Supply Iran With Sensitive U.S. Technology

/PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- An Iranian citizen and his Tehran business have been charged with purchasing helicopter engines and advanced aerial cameras for fighter bombers from U.S. firms and illegally exporting them to Iran using companies in Malaysia, Ireland and the Netherlands. Among the alleged recipients of these U.S. goods was an Iranian military firm that has since been designated by the United States for being owned or controlled by entities involved in Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program.

The charges against Hossein Ali Khoshnevisrad, 55, and his Iranian company, Ariasa, AG (Ariasa), were announced today by Matthew G. Olsen, Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia; Kevin A. Delli-Colli, Acting Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, U.S. Department of Commerce; Joseph Persichini, Jr., Assistant Director in Charge, FBI Washington Field Office; Mark X. McGraw, Special Agent in Charge, Washington Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security; and Special Agent in Charge Edward Bradley of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service Northeast Field Office.

Khoshnevisrad was arrested on Saturday, March 14, after he arrived at San Francisco International Airport on a flight from abroad. He made his initial appearance earlier today in federal court in San Francisco.

A criminal complaint filed under seal in federal court in the District of Columbia in August 2008 and unsealed today, charges the defendants each with two counts of unlawfully exporting U.S. goods to Iran and two counts of conspiracy to unlawfully export U.S. goods to Iran in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Iranian Transactions Regulations. If convicted, Khoshnevisrad faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison on each of the first three counts of the complaint and a maximum sentence of five years in prison on the fourth count of the complaint.

According to the affidavit in support of the complaint, from January 2007 through December 2007, Khoshnevisrad and Ariasa caused and instructed a trading company in Ireland to purchase several model 250 turbo-shaft helicopter engines from Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indiana. The model 250 engine was originally designed for a U.S. Army light observation helicopter and has since been installed in numerous civil and military helicopters. In 2007, the Irish trading company purchased 17 of the model 250 helicopter engines from Rolls-Royce for $4.27 million, falsely stating that the helicopters would be used by the Irish trading company or by fake companies.

The affidavit alleges that these helicopter engines were then exported from the United States to a purported "book publisher" in Malaysia, at a Malaysian freight forwarding company address, and later shipped on to Iran. Among the recipients in Iran was the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company, known by its Iranian acronym as HESA.

On Sept. 17, 2008, the Treasury Department designated several Iranian weapons of mass destruction proliferators and members of their support networks pursuant to Executive Order 13382. Among the entities designated was HESA, which the Treasury Department determined was controlled by Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and has provided support to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

In addition to the alleged illegal export of helicopter engines, the affidavit alleges that Khoshnevisrad and Ariasa also caused to be exported to Iran several aerial panorama cameras from the United States. These specific cameras were designed for the U.S. Air Force for use on bombers, fighters and surveillance aircraft, including the F-4E Phantom fighter bomber, which is currently used by the Iranian military.

According to the affidavit, in 2006, Khoshnevisrad instructed a Dutch aviation parts company to place an order for these cameras with a U.S. company located in Pennsylvania and to ship them to an address in Iran.

According to the affidavit, the Dutch company ordered the aerial panorama cameras from the Pennsylvania firm, falsely stating that the Netherlands would be the final destination for the cameras. In an email to the Dutch company, Khoshnevisrad provided the following instructions: "Regarding the end user as you know USA will not deliver to Iran in any case. You should give them an end user by yourself."

In August 2006, a representative of the Dutch company notified Khoshnevisrad that he had received the cameras from the United States and that the cameras would soon be shipped to Tehran aboard an Iran Air flight, according to the affidavit.

Despite these alleged transactions, neither Khoshnevisrad nor Ariasa has ever sought, obtained or possessed any authorization or license from the U.S. Department of Treasury to export any goods or technology to Iran, according to the affidavit.

This investigation was conducted by special agents from the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry Security, Office of Export Enforcement; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service. U.S. Customs and Border Protection provided assistance in the arrest.

The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Denise Cheung and Ann Petalas of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, and Trial Attorneys Johnathan Poling and Ryan Fayhee of the Counterespionage Section of the Justice Department's National Security Division. Local coordination is being provided by Assistant U.S. Attorney Candace Kelly of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California.

The details contained in a criminal complaint are mere allegations. All defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law.

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FBI Perspective on Threats from Somalia

Philip Mudd
Associate Executive Assistant Director, National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

March 11, 2009

Good morning Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here today. Thank you for the opportunity to provide the FBI’s perspective on the issue of threats from Somalia and their effect on the security of the United States. I will also discuss our assessment of why a number of individuals have left the United States to train or fight in Somalia, and how the FBI is working with our law enforcement and intelligence partners to respond to the threat.

Somalia Overview

Somalia continues to be wracked by instability and, despite efforts to bring some measure of peace and stability to that country, is still plagued by conflict among various competing factions. The rise of violent extremist Islamist elements—like the al-Shabaab militia, which has made significant gains in the aftermath of the Ethiopian invasion in late 2006—has made the security environment there even more unsettled. Al-Shabaab is one of the most significant forces on the ground in Somalia and has conducted a range of operations against a number of different targets inside the country. While the Ethiopian government withdrew all combat forces in mid-January, al-Shabaab has conducted follow-on attacks against African Union peacekeeping troops, as well as international aide workers. Al-Shabaab’s use of tactics such as suicide bombings, kidnappings, beheadings, and murders only serves to burnish its reputation for violence.

Beyond the threat al-Shabaab poses in Somalia, its connections to other extremists in the region and beyond add to concern over its activities. Al-Shabaab has links to the al Qaeda in East Africa network—including individuals responsible for the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania—and maintains ties with al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Al Qaeda’s focus on Somalia is in part reflected in its propaganda: top al Qaeda advisor Ayman al-Zawahiri, for example, proclaimed in a February 2009 statement that gains made by al-Shabaab in Somalia were “a step on the path of victory of Islam.” Such propaganda suggests al Qaeda leaders see Somalia as a potential recruiting, training, or staging ground for anti-U.S. or Western operations in the region, or even more disturbing, around the globe.

Dynamics in the United States

An estimated two million to three million Somalis live outside of Somalia or the Horn of Africa, and the ethnic Somali community in the United States is estimated to range from 150,000 to 200,000. However, high rates of illegal immigration, widespread identity and documentation fraud, and a cultural reluctance to share personal information with census takers has prevented an accurate count of the ethnic Somali population inside the United States. Ethnic Somalis began arriving in Minneapolis, Minnesota in the mid-1990s on the heels of a broader resettlement program, and the area is now home to the single largest population of ethnic Somalis in the United States. Other cities with reported large concentrations of ethnic Somalis include Columbus, Ohio; Seattle, Washington; Washington, D.C.; San Diego, California; and Atlanta, Georgia.

Since late 2006, we have seen several individuals from the United States—many with ethnic ties to Somalia and some without such connections—travel to Somalia to train or fight on behalf of al-Shabaab. The number of individuals we believe have departed for Somalia is comparatively larger than the number of individuals who have left the United States for other conflict zones around the world over the past few years. And we have seen more individuals leave from the Minneapolis area than from any other part of the country.

In Minneapolis, we believe there has been an active and deliberate attempt to recruit individuals—all of whom are young men, some only in their late teens—to travel to Somalia to fight or train on behalf of al-Shabaab. We assess that for the majority of these individuals, the primary motivation for such travel was to defend their place of birth from the Ethiopian invasion, although an appeal was also made based on their shared Islamic identity. A range of socio-economic conditions—such as violent youth crime and gang subcultures, and tensions over cultural integration—may have also played some role in the recruitment process. We also note that several of the travelers from Minneapolis came from single-parent households, potentially making them more susceptible to recruitment from charismatic male authority figures.

While there are no current indicators that any of the individuals who traveled to Somalia have been selected, trained, or tasked by al-Shabaab or other extremists to conduct attacks inside the United States, we remain concerned about this possibility and that it might be exploited in the future if other U.S. persons travel to Somalia for similar purpos es. The fact that one of the Minneapolis youths participated in a suicide attack in northern Somalia in late October 2008—which we believe is the first instance of a U.S. citizen participating in a suicide attack anywhere—has only added to concern over the possibility that individuals may engage in terrorist activity upon their return to the United States.

Comparison to the United Kingdom

Much has been written about the circumstances of many South Asians in the United Kingdom, and how a variety of factors has contributed to an environment in which hundreds of individuals became involved in extremist activity there and in South Asia. Among the factors having some impact on South Asian communities in the United Kingdom are social and cultural alienation, demographic patterns, underemployment or unemployment, youth and gang-related violence, the existence of active extremist recruitment and facilitation networks, and natural access to an active conflict zone based on family or ethnic connections.

For the overwhelming majority of immigrant Muslim-American communities inside the United States, this U.K. environment stands in sharp contrast. As recent public opinion polls—such as the May 2007 Pew Poll and recent Gallup Poll—have shown, Muslim-Americans are for the most part well-integrated, and they achieve statistically higher levels of economic and educational achievement than most other minority groups within the United States. While poll results show that grievances do exist for Muslim-Americans, the vast majority do not condone the use of violence to provide any redress.

Despite the events in Minneapolis and examples of U.S. persons from other parts of the country who have traveled to Somalia for training or fighting, we do not believe that Somali communities here face the same challenges as similar South Asian communities in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, some of the same factors that have contributed to the high level of extremist activity in the South Asian U.K. environment are evident in some Somali communities inside the United States, which indicates the need for heightened outreach and engagement in order to prevent these from manifesting into direct threats to the Homeland.

Outreach and Engagement

Since the 9/11 attacks, the FBI has developed an extensive outreach program to Muslim, South Asian, and Sikh communities to develop trust, address concerns, and dispel myths in those communities about the FBI and the U.S. government. In the wake of developments in Minneapolis, the FBI initiated a pilot program focused on enhancing outreach and engagement activities with select field offices that were dealing with some aspect of the Somalia traveler issue. This program is still in the proof-of-concept phase, but is expected to provide multiple benefits for the FBI and the Somali communities within the purview of the select field offices.

Partnership with State and Local Government

The FBI has long partnered with state and local law enforcement. In the counterterrorism domain, that partnership has been sustained through more than 25 years of involvement in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) throughout the country. While the FBI is the lead federal agency for terrorism investigations inside the United States, we recognize the vast resources, experience, and insight our state and local law enforcement partners have within the areas in which our field offices and satellite offices reside. One such example includes a partnership among our Minneapolis Field Office and local law enforcement, educators, and social service agency representatives to discuss issues of interest and concern regarding the Somali community there.

We are leveraging our relationships with state and local law enforcement in various field offices beyond the traditional JTTF structure to enhance our understanding or insight into the Somalia issue and its possible impact on the United States, including fostering new initiatives with units involved in traditional criminal or gang programs.

Intelligence Community Collaboration

The FBI continues to work with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community to assess, evaluate, monitor, and—if required—disrupt, any potential threats based on activity related to extremism in Somalia. FBI analysts work closely with their counterparts at the Department of Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Nation al Counterterrorism Center to evaluate events in Somalia and how they might affect the United States. Operationally, FBI agents work with a range of counterparts to develop programs to collect intelligence and disrupt any possible threats relating to individuals who have traveled to Somalia for extremist activity, or wish to travel in the future. Information regarding analysis and operations is shared routinely and continuously, and up to the highest levels of decision-makers in various agencies.

Threat to the Homeland

On balance, we are concerned about the recruitment of individuals from the United States to Somalia and their involvement in training or fighting there. While there are likely a variety of motivations affecting such individuals, it remains unclear whether the allure of Somalia as an active conflict zone has diminished in the wake of Ethiopia’s withdrawal—thereby removing a primary grievance based on nationalism—or whether it will continue to attract individuals from the West who see Somalia as a permissive environment given ongoing instability.

While al-Shabaab’s foothold in Somalia remains tenuous, it has secured a number of gains in recent months, and its proclivity for extreme violence remains a hallmark. Most worrisome are links between al-Shabaab and al Qaeda associates in the region and elsewhere, and the degree to which Somalia will become another safe haven from which to train, recruit, and then deploy Westerners already there for attacks against their home countries is an open question. Currently, there are no clear indicators that this is occurring, but there are several gaps in our understanding of events there that preclude a more robust understanding of the nature and severity of the threat to the West or United States.

Conclusion

Today, the FBI continues to collect intelligence and assess any potential threats to the United States based on activity related to extremism in Somalia. We are working closely with our U.S. Intelligence Community and law enforcement counterparts to analyze the vulnerability of the United States to such an attack. We will build on these relationships as we continue efforts to stay ahead of the threats and protect our Homeland.

We thank the Committee for its continued support of the FBI and its national security mission. And we look forward to continuing to work with you to protect our nation and its citizens.

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Leading Civil Liberties and Human Rights Organizations Urge Obama Not to Create On-Shore Guantanamo System

/PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- Four leading civil liberties and human rights organizations today urged President-elect Obama to implement "an unqualified return to America's established system of justice for detaining and prosecuting suspects" when he fulfills his pledge to shut down the Guantanamo Bay prison camp and military commissions. In a letter delivered to the presidential transition team, the American Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty International USA, Human Rights First and Human Rights Watch state that they "categorically oppose the creation of any other ad-hoc illegal detention system or 'third way' that permits the executive branch to suspend due process and hold suspected terrorists without charge or trial, essentially moving Guantanamo on-shore."

The full text of the letter is as follows:

Dear President-elect Obama:


As heads of four prominent civil liberties and human rights organizations, we wish to convey our uniform position on the steps we believe should be taken once you fulfill your pledge to close the Guantanamo Bay prison camp.

Our groups firmly advocate an unqualified return to America's established system of justice for detaining and prosecuting suspects. We categorically oppose the creation of any other ad-hoc illegal detention system or "third way" that permits the executive branch to suspend due process and hold suspected terrorists without charge or trial, essentially moving Guantanamo on-shore.

As you know, the Geneva Conventions allow for the detention of enemy soldiers captured on the battlefield until the cessation of international armed conflict. But what is new -- and altogether radical -- is the notion that a wartime detention model can be applied to something as amorphous as a "war on terror" that lacks a definable enemy, geographical boundary, or the prospect of ending anytime soon. If a conflict exists everywhere and forever, empowering the government to detain combatants until the end of hostilities takes on a whole new and deeply disturbing meaning.

We are confident that when you take office, you will immediately set a date certain for closing Guantanamo. The new Justice Department should conduct a fresh review of all detainee records to determine whether there is legitimate evidence of criminal activity. Where there is not, detainees should be repatriated to their home countries for trial or release. If there is a risk of torture or abuse in their home countries, they should be transferred to third countries that will accept them or admitted to the United States.

Where evidence of criminal activity does exist, detainees should be prosecuted in traditional federal courts. Contrary to the views of proponents of detention without trial who argue that America's existing courts can't handle terrorism prosecutions, the United States justice system has a long history of handling terrorism cases without compromising fundamental rights of defendants while accommodating sensitive national security issues. In fact, a recent analysis of more than 100 successfully prosecuted international terrorism cases conducted by two former federal prosecutors for Human Rights First found that "the justice system ... continues to evolve to meet the challenge terrorism cases pose." Our courts have proven that they can handle sensitive evidence. The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) outlines a comprehensive set of procedures for federal criminal cases involving classified information. Applying CIPA over the years, courts have successfully balanced the need to protect national security information, including the sources and means of intelligence gathering, with defendants' fair trial rights.

Some have argued that the best way to deal with the toughest cases at Guantanamo would be to establish what amounts to another unconstitutional detention system once the island prison camp is shut down. The proponents of this school of thought claim that there are some detainees who are too dangerous to be released but who cannot face criminal charges. This is mostly based on the assumptions that some detainees have committed crimes not covered by American law, that some cases rely on sensitive national security information that cannot be disclosed in open court, and that the evidence against some detainees would not be admissible in a regular court because it was coerced through torture or abuse.

But federal prosecutors have an imposing array of prosecutorial weapons at their disposal, including laws that criminalize conspiring or attempting to commit homicide, harboring or concealing terrorists, and providing "material support" to terrorist organizations. The government can secure a conviction for conspiracy by showing only an agreement to commit a crime against the United States and any overt act in furtherance of that agreement. If the government cannot meet that minimal burden of proof, it is difficult to see why it should continue to detain a suspect.

It is true that many of the statements obtained from detainees through abusive interrogation would not be admissible in a court of law. But the fact that the American justice system prohibits imprisonment on the basis of evidence tortured out of prisoners is one of its strengths, not a weakness; it's why we call it a "justice system" in the first place. Moreover, one would hope that if a prisoner were as guilty or dangerous as claimed, the government would be able to gather enough admissible evidence to prove its case from untainted sources, such as computers or cell phones that were seized, conversations that were intercepted, or physical surveillance that was conducted.

But most importantly, to create a whole new detention system and enact new legislation to accommodate the Bush administration's shameful torture policies would be a legal and moral catastrophe. Even the most unequivocal repudiation of torture would be hollow if your administration were to construct another regime to hide its occurrence and evade its consequences.

The lessons from the military commissions debacle should be heeded. It is not possible to create a brand new system of justice from scratch in the United States without enduring years of litigation and controversy. Any new national court system or regime that allows detention without due process will be challenged, most likely all the way to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, there will be massive controversy and uncertainty about the fate of detainees caught up in it.

There's no doubt the Bush administration's abhorrent detention policies have left you, the American people and the entire world with a huge mess to clean up. At the same time, you have inherited a huge opportunity to lead America on its journey to regain its values and credibility. This cannot be done with half-steps. There's no such thing as "sort of upholding our principles to the extent possible." We strongly urge you to uncompromisingly restore America's role as a nation that stands for decency, justice and the rule of law.

With gratitude for your consideration in this matter,


Anthony D. Romero
Executive Director
American Civil Liberties Union

Larry Cox
Executive Director
Amnesty International USA

Elisa Massimino
Executive Director
Human Rights First

Kenneth Roth
Executive Director
Human Rights Watch

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