Bipartisan Policy Center Report Outlines Dangers of Failing to Prevent Iranian Nuclear Threat

/PRNewswire/ -- With Iran on the brink of attaining nuclear weapons capability, the Bipartisan Policy Center's (BPC) National Security Initiative is calling for the United States to take a triple-track approach for preventing an Iranian nuclear threat through diplomacy, sanctions and a military option. According to its new report released today, Meeting the Challenge: When Time Runs Out, authored by former Senators Daniel Coats and Charles Robb, and retired General Charles Wald, there are three potential outcomes should the U.S. fail to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions: a nuclear weapons-capable Islamic Republic of Iran; an Israeli military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities; or a regime change in Tehran.

The report, which is the third in a series by the BPC on Iran, argues that containing a nuclear Iran would almost certainly prove ineffective and lead to a greater regional conflict. It also stresses that an Israeli strike would be risky and regime change is extremely unlikely. Therefore, the report's co-authors strongly assert that a nuclear Iran must be prevented now.

An analysis by the BPC shows that Iran, under current trends, could have enough fissile material in July to produce a nuclear weapon by October 2010. With diplomatic and economic efforts having failed to dissuade Iran from developing its nuclear capability, the authors warn that time is literally running out.

The report recommends the U.S. immediately adopt a triple-track strategy that involves diplomacy, sanctions, and a clear demonstration of its willingness to use the military option as a last resort. The BPC has advocated this strategy in its earlier reports. "Sanctions and diplomacy are much more likely to work if they are backed up by a credible military capability and the clear willingness to use it," said Senator Charles Robb. "We reiterate our support for the President's 2009 pledge to use 'all elements of U.S. power' to keep Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability."

According to the BPC, the U.S. could immediately strengthen its position by increasing the U.S. Fifth Fleet's presence in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman; enhancing the military capabilities of U.S. allies in the region; initiating a strategic partnership with Azerbaijan to establish a broader regional presence on the ground; and by working with Iraq and Saudi Arabia to improve their capacity to ship oil out of the region without passing through the Straits of Hormuz. "Only the credible threat of a U.S. military strike can make a peaceful solution possible," said retired General Chuck Wald. "Ultimately, a U.S. led military strike is a feasible, though risky, option of last resort."

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New Counterterrorism Report Warns of Rising al-Qaeda Threat in N. Africa;Calls Resolving W. Sahara Conflict Key for Regional Cooperation to Fight Back

/PRNewswire/ -- Just days after President Barack Obama underscored in his State of the Union address America's commitment to "take the fight to al-Qaeda," a new counterterrorism report was issued today documenting a dramatic 558 percent jump in terrorist attacks and activity by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in North and West/Central Africa since 9/11.

The report was released at the 11th annual terrorism review and outlook seminar of the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, hosted this morning by the Brookings Institution. The event brought together a panel of former CIA, US State Department and Department of Homeland Security officials, as well as international experts, to examine the growing threat and changing face of international terrorism.

The panel was unanimous in identifying al-Qaeda as the most serious terrorist threat to the US, evidenced by the recent failed Christmas suicide bombing attempt on Northwest flight 253 over Detroit organized by al-Qaeda forces in Yemen. "Al-Qaeda remains dangerous, though damaged" by recent US strikes against it in Pakistan, said Charles Allen, Undersecretary for Intelligence, US Department of Homeland Security. The new development, the panel agreed, is that al-Qaeda's regional affiliates continue to pose a serious threat even as its core leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan has come under siege.

The new report, authored by Professor Yonah Alexander, Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies, highlights the growing danger posed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. "If we truly want to take the fight to al-Qaeda, we must go everywhere they pose a serious threat," said Prof. Alexander. "A comprehensive US counterterrorism strategy must address the increasingly volatile terrorist breeding ground in North and West/Central Africa, where al-Qaeda and other terrorists are exploiting weak regional security cooperation and links to narco-trafficking networks in Latin America to recruit and train terrorists to carry out attacks in the region and elsewhere."

The special report "Maghreb & Sahel Terrorism: Addressing the Rising Threat from al-Qaeda & other Terrorists in North & West/Central Africa," was published by the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. It analyzes and provides a timeline for how al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have taken root and flourished in the region since 9/11.

As a key step to combat terrorism, the report recommends resolving the more than 30-year-old Western Sahara conflict, which is a major obstacle to regional security and economic cooperation. Alexander noted today that "the Tindouf camps in Algeria, where refugees have been confined for decades without hope, present a prime breeding ground for potential recruits by the terrorists." The report outlines a number of other recommendations, including: strengthening US intelligence in the region; expanding US counterterrorism technical assistance to Maghreb/Sahel countries; and raising diplomatic, economic, political, and military costs to Iran to discourage its support of jihadist terrorism in the region.

The Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) is a non-profit organization whose principal mission is to inform opinion makers, government officials and interested publics in the United States about political and social developments in Morocco and the role being played by the Kingdom of Morocco in broader strategic developments in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. For more, please visit www.moroccanamericanpolicy.org

This material is distributed by the Moroccan American Center for Policy on behalf of the Government of Morocco. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC.

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White House Review Summary Regarding 12/25/2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack

On December 25,2009 a Nigerian national, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate an explosive device while onboard flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit. The device did not explode, but instead ignited, injuring Mr. Abdulmutallab and two other passengers. The flight crew restrained Mr. Abdulmutallab and the plane safely landed. Mr. Abdulmutallab was taken into custody by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and later was questioned by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI). Mr. Abdulmutallab was not on the U.S. Government's (USG) terrorist watchlist, but was known to the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).

BACKGROUND

Following the December 25, 2009 attempt to bring down the flight by detonating an explosive device onboard flight 253, the President directed that Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan conduct a complete review of the terrorist watchlisting system and directed that key departments and agencies provide input to this review. What follows is a summary of this preliminary report.

First, it should be noted that the work by America's counterterrorism (CT) community has had many successes since 9111 that should be applauded. Our ability to protect the U.S. Homeland against terrorist attacks is only as good as the information and analysis that drives and facilitates disruption efforts. The thorough analysis of large volumes of information has enabled a variety of departments and agencies to take action to prevent attacks. On a great number of occasions since 9111, many of which the American people will never know about, the tremendous, hardworking corps of analysts across the CT community did just that, working day and night to track terrorist threats and run down possible leads in order to keep their fellow Americans safe. Yet, as the amount of information continues to grow, the challenge to bring disparate pieces of information - about individuals, groups, and vague plots - together to form a clear picture about the intentions of our adversaries grows as well.

These actions, informed by the excellent analytic work of the very same individuals and structure that is under review, have saved lives. Unfortunately, despite several opportunities that might have allowed the CT community to put these pieces together in this case, and despite the tireless effort and best intentions of individuals at every level of the CT community, that was not done. As a result, the recent events highlight our need to look for ways to constantly improve and assist our CT analysts, who are at the forefront of providing warning of terrorist attacks and keeping Americans safe.

1 This report reflects preliminary findings to facilitate immediate corrective action. Neither the report nor its findings obviate the need for continued review and analysis to ensure that we have the fullest possible understanding of the systemic problems that led to the attempted terrorist attack on December 25,2009. Note further that sensitive intelligence data was removed from this public report to protect sources and methods.

FINDINGS

The preliminary White House review of the events that led to the attempted December 25 attack highlights human errors and a series of systematic breakdowns failed to stop Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab before he was able to detonate an explosive device onboard flight 253. The most significant failures and shortcomings that led to the attempted terror attack fall into three broad categories:

A failure of intelligence analysis, whereby the CT community failed before December 25 to identify, correlate, and fuse into a coherent story all of the discrete pieces of intelligence held by the u.s. Government related to an emerging terrorist plot against the U.S. Homeland organized by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and to Mr. Abdulmutallab, the individual terrorist;
A failure within the CT community, starting with established rules and protocols, to assign responsibility and accountability for follow up of high priority threat streams, run down all leads, and track them through to completion; and
Shortcomings of the watchlisting system, whereby the CT community failed to identify intelligence within u.S. government holdings that would have allowed Mr. Abdulmutallab to be watchlisted, and potentially prevented from boarding an aircraft bound for the United States.

The most significant findings of our preliminary review are:

The U.S. Government had sufficient information prior to the attempted December 25 attack to have potentially disrupted the AQAP plot-i.e., by identifying Mr. Abdulmutallab as a likely operative of AQAP and potentially preventing him from boarding flight 253.
The Intelligence Community leadership did not increase analytic resources working on the full AQAP threat.
The watchlisting system is not broken but needs to be strengthened and improved, as evidenced by the failure to add Mr. Abdulmutallab to the No Fly watchlist.
A reorganization of the intelligence or broader counterterrorism community is not required to address problems that surfaced in the review, a fact made clear by countless other successful efforts to thwart ongoing plots.

FAILURE TO "CONNECT THE DOTS"

It is important to note that the fundamental problems identified in this preliminary review are different from those identified in the wake of the 9111 attacks. Previously, there were formidable barriers to information sharing among departments and agencies--tied to firmly entrenched patterns of bureaucratic behavior as well as the absence of a single component that fuses expertise, information technology (IT) networks, and datasets-that have now, 8 years later, largely been overcome.

An understanding of the responsibilities of different analytic components of the CT community is critical to identifying what went wrong and how best to fix it. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to be "the primary organization in the U.S. government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S. government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism

2." Intelligence Community guidance in 2006 further defined counterterrorism analytic responsibilities and tasked NCTC with the primary role within the Intelligence Community for bringing together and assessing all-source intelligence to enable a full understanding of and proper response to particular terrorist threat streams. Additionally, the Director of NCTC is in charge of the DNI Homeland Threat Task Force, whose mission is to examine threats to the U.S. Homeland from al-Qa'ida, its allies, and homegrown violent extremists.

Notwithstanding NCTC's central role in producing terrorism analysis, CIA maintains the responsibility and resource capability to "correlate and evaluate intelligence related to national security and provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence.

3 CIA's responsibility for conducting all-source analysis in the area of counterterrorism is focused on supporting its operations overseas, as well as informing its leadership of terrorist threats and terrorist targets overseas. Therefore, both agencies - NCTC and CIA - have a role to play in conducting (and a responsibility to carry out) all-source analysis to identify operatives and uncover specific plots like the attempted December 25 attack.

The information available to the CT community over the last several months - which included pieces of information about Mr. Abdulmutallab, information about AQAP and its plans, and information about an individual now believed to be Mr. Abdulmutallab and his association with AQAP and its attack planning - was obtained by several agencies. Though all of that information was available to all-source analysts at the CIA and the NCTC prior to the attempted attack, the dots were never connected, and as a result, the problem appears to be more about a component failure to "connect the dots," rather than a lack of information sharing. The information that was available to analysts, as is usually the case, was fragmentary and embedded in a large volume of other data.

Though the consumer base and operational capabilities of CIA and NCTC are somewhat different, the intentional redundancy in the system should have added an additional layer of protection in uncovering a plot like the failed attack on December 25. However, in both cases, the mission to "connect the dots" did not produce the result that, in hindsight, it could have - connecting identifying information about Mr. Abdulmutallab with fragments of information about his association with AQAP and the group's intention of attacking the U.S.

The majority of these discreet pieces of intelligence were gathered between mid-October and late December 2009.

For example, on November 18, Mr. Abdulmutallab's father met with U.S. Embassy officers in Abuja, Nigeria, to discuss his concerns that his son may have come under the influence of unidentified extremists, and had planned to travel to Yemen. Though this information alone could not predict Mr. Abdulmutallab's eventual involvement in the attempted 25 December attack, it provided an opportunity to link information on him with earlier intelligence reports that contained fragmentary information.

Analytic focus during December was on the imminent AQAP attacks on Americans and American interests in Yemen, and on supporting CT efforts in Yemen.

Despite these opportunities and multiple intelligence products that noted the threat AQAP could pose to the Homeland, the different pieces of the puzzle were never brought together in this casethe dots were never connected, and, as a result, steps to disrupt the plot involving Mr. Abdulmutallab were not taken prior to his boarding of the airplane with an explosive device and attempting to detonate it in-flight.

BREAKDOWN OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THREAT WARNING & RESPONSE

Intelligence is not an end to itself, nor are analytic products-they are designed to provide senior government leaders with the necessary information to make key decisions, but also to trigger action, including further collection, operational steps, and investigative adjustments. As noted above, NCTC and CIA have the primary and overlapping responsibility to conduct all-source analysis on terrorism. As with this intentional analytic redundancy, the CT community also has multiple and overlapping warning systems to ensure that departments and agencies are kept fully aware of ongoing threat streams.

NCTC is the primary organization that provides situational awareness to the CT community of ongoing terrorist threats and events, including through several daily written products that summarize current threat reporting for a broad audience, as well as meetings and video teleconferences that provide the opportunity for the CT community to engage in a real-time manner on this information. While the threat warning system involves analysis, it also extends to other elements within the CT community that should be responsible for following up and acting on leads as a particular threat situation develops.

In this context, the preliminary review suggests that the overlapping layers of protection within the CT community failed to track this threat in a manner sufficient to ensure all leads were followed and acted upon to conclusion. In addition, the White House and the National Security Staff failed to identify this gap ahead of time. No single component of the CT community assumed responsibility for the threat reporting and followed it through by ensuring that all necessary steps were taken to disrupt the threat. This argues that a process is needed to track terrorist threat reporting to ensure that departments and agencies are held accountable for running down all leads associated with high visibility and high priority plotting efforts, in particular against the U.S. Homeland.

FAILURE TO WATCHLIST

Although Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was included in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), the failure to include Mr. Abdulmutallab in a watchlist is part of the overall systemic failure. Pursuant to the IRTPA, NCTC serves "as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups.,
4 As such, NCTC consolidates all information on known and suspected international terrorists in the Terrorist Identities Datarnart Environment. NCTC then makes this data available to the FBI-led Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which reviews nominations for inclusion in the master watchlist called the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). The TSC provides relevant extracts to each organization with a screening mission.

Hindsight suggests that the evaluation by watchlisting personnel of the information contained in the State cable nominating Mr. Abdulmutallab did not meet the minimum derogatory standard to watchlist. Watchlisting would have required all of the available information to be fused so that the derogatory information would have been sufficient to support nomination to be watchlisted in the Terrorist Screening Database. Watchlist personnel had access to additional derogatory information in databases that could have been connected to Mr. Abdulmutallab, but that access did not result in them uncovering the biographic information that would have been necessary for placement on the watchlist. Ultimately, placement on the No FIy List would have been required to keep Mr. Abdulmutallab off the plane inbound for the U.S. Homeland.

VISA ISSUE

Mr. Abdulmutallab possessed a U.S. visa, but this fact was not correlated with the concerns ofMr. Abdulmutallab's father about Mr. Abdulmutallab's potential radicalization. A misspelling of Mr. Abdulmutallab's name initially resulted in the State Department believing he did not have a valid U.S. visa. A determination to revoke his visa, however, would have only occurred ifthere had been a successful integration of intelligence by the CT community, resulting in his being watchlisted.

KEY FINDINGS EMERGING FROM PRELIMINARY INQUIRY & REVIEW

The U.S. government had sufficient information to have uncovered and potentially disrupted the December 25 attack-including by placing Mr. Abdulmutallab on the No Fly list -- but analysts within the CT community failed to connect the dots that could have identified and warned of the specific threat. The preponderance of the intelligence related to this plot was available broadly to the Intelligence Community.

NCTC and CIA are empowered to collate and assess all-source intelligence on the CT threat, but all-source analysts highlighted largely the evolving "strategic threat" AQAP posed to the West, and the U.S. Homeland specifically, in finished intelligence products. In addition, some of the improvised explosive device tactics AQAP might use against U.S. interests were highlighted in finished intelligence products.

The CT community failed to follow-up further on this "strategic warning" by moving aggressively to further identify and correlate critical indicators of AQAP's threat to the U.S. Homeland with the full range of analytic tools and expertise that it uses in tracking other plots aimed at the U.S. Homeland.

NCTC and CIA personnel who are responsible for watchlisting did not search all available databases to uncover additional derogatory information that could have been correlated with Mr. Abdulmutallab.

A series of human errors occurred----delayed dissemination of a finished intelligence report and what appears to be incomplete/faulty database searches on Mr. Abdulmutallab's name and identifying information.

"Information sharing" does not appear to have contributed to this intelligence failure; relevant all-source analysts as well as watchlisting personnel who needed this information were not prevented from accessing it.

Information technology within the CT community did not sufficiently enable the correlation of data that would have enabled analysts to highlight the relevant threat information.

There was not a comprehensive or functioning process for tracking terrorist threat reporting and actions taken such that departments and agencies are held accountable for running down all leads associated with high visibility and high priority plotting efforts undertaken by alQa'ida and its allies, in particular against the U.S. Homeland.

Finally, we must review and determine the ongoing suitability of legacy standards and protocols in effect across the CT community, including criteria for watch lists, protocols for secondary screening, visa suspension and revocation criteria, and business processes across the government.

Office of the Press Secretary
The White House

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'Time is Running Out' to Prevent Nuclear Iran

/PRNewswire/ -- Former U.S. Senators Daniel Coats and Charles Robb and General (ret.) Charles Wald, members of the Bipartisan Policy Center's (BPC) National Security Initiative, today released a report warning that "time is running out" to prevent a nuclear weapons-capable Iran. Concluding that "the Islamic Republic will be able to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by 2010," the report, entitled "Meeting the Challenge: Time is Running Out," calls on the Obama Administration to adopt a more forceful, phased strategy towards Iran, including: accelerated, defined diplomatic engagement; more "coercive" international sanctions; and, if Iranian defiance continues unabated, potential surgical military action.

Remarking on the need to update the original report, the authors jointly stated, "We are alarmed by how much progress Iran has made toward obtaining nuclear weapons capability and remain skeptical about the sincerity of Iran's new-found willingness to negotiate. We hope that the bipartisan strategy we propose can help guide our government to resolve this difficult and urgent national security challenge."

Emphasizing that a nuclear weapons-capable Iran would be "strategically untenable," the authors argue that the current U.S. approach does not reflect the rapid progress of Iran's nuclear program. It is this advancing Iranian threat and the desire to avoid a possible Israeli military strike, the authors argue, that should drive U.S. policy--not concerns over Iran's political turmoil.

The authors applaud President Obama's attempts at diplomatic outreach and call upon the international community to join together in imposing sanctions on Iran's banking and energy sectors following next week's G-20 summit. Noting that Russia and China are unlikely to support such sanctions, the report states that the efficacy of sanctions will largely depend upon the willingness of key European nations to curtail their commercial ties to Iran.

Should increased pressure on Tehran not yield credible progress by the end of 2009, the authors recommend that "the Obama Administration should elevate consideration of the military option." They argue that "the U.S. military is more than capable of launching a devastating strike against Iranian nuclear and military facilities," and that "only the credible threat of a U.S. military strike will make a peaceful resolution of the crisis possible."

This report is an update of a BPC report issued in September 2008, entitled "Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development," that was the result of a high-level bipartisan task force. The entire group could not be reconstituted, as some members are now serving in the Obama Administration. The co-chairs of the original task force--Senators Daniel Coats and Charles Robb--together with General (ret.) Charles Wald, felt that the political, technological, diplomatic, and military developments of the past year needed to be addressed.

Calling on the U.S. political leadership to make hard choices, the authors argue "we cannot shirk responsibilities that will protect the national security interests of our country."

For more information on "Meeting the Challenge: Time is Running Out," or the BPC's National Security Initiative, please visit: www.bipartisanpolicy.org/.

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Arts Across Georgia

Text of a Letter from the President To The Speaker Of The House Of Representatives And The President Pro Tempore Of The Senate

December 16, 2008

Dear Madam Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

I am providing this supplemental consolidated report, prepared by my Administration and consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), as part of my efforts to keep the Congress informed about deployments of U.S. combat-equipped Armed Forces around the world. This supplemental report covers operations in support of the war on terror and in Kosovo.

THE WAR ON TERROR

Since September 24, 2001, I have reported, consistent with Public Law 107-40 and the War Powers Resolution, on the combat operations in Afghanistan against al-Qaida terrorists and their Taliban supporters, which began on October 7, 2001, and the deployment of various combat-equipped and combat-support forces to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and Africa Command areas of operation in support of those operations and of other operations in our war on terror.

I will direct additional measures as necessary in the exercise of the right of the United States to self-defense and to protect U.S. citizens and interests. Such measures may include short-notice deployments of special operations and other forces for sensitive operations in various locations throughout the world. It is not possible to know at this time the precise scope or the duration of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States.

United States Armed Forces, with the assistance of numerous coalition partners, continue to conduct the U.S. campaign to pursue al-Qaida terrorists and to eliminate support to al-Qaida. These operations have been successful in seriously degrading al-Qaida's training capabilities. United States Armed Forces, with the assistance of numerous coalition partners, ended the Taliban regime and are actively pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. The total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is approximately 31,000, of which approximately 13,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The U.N. Security Council authorized ISAF in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 of December 20, 2001, and has reaffirmed its authorization since that time, most recently for a 12-month period from October 13, 2008, in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1833 of September 22, 2008. The mission of ISAF under NATO command is to assist the Government of Afghanistan in creating a safe and secure environment that allows for continued reconstruction and the exercise and extension of Afghan authority. Currently, more than 40 nations contribute to ISAF, including all 26 NATO Allies.

The United States continues to detain several hundred al-Qaida and Taliban fighters who are believed to pose a continuing threat to the United States and its interests. The combat-equipped and combat-support forces deployed to Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in the U.S. Southern Command area of operations since January 2002 continue to conduct secure detention operations for the enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay.

The U.N. Security Council authorized a Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq under unified command in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 of October 16, 2003, and reaffirmed its authorization in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 of June 8, 2004, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1637 of November 8, 2005, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1723 of November 28, 2006, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1790 of December 18, 2007, set to expire on December 31, 2008. Under Resolutions 1546, 1637, 1723, and 1790, the mission of the MNF is to contribute to security and stability in Iraq. These contributions have included, but have not been limited to, assisting in building the capability of the Iraqi security forces, supporting the development of Iraq's political institutions, improving local governance, enhancing ministerial capacity, and providing critical humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to the Iraqis. The U.S. contribution to the MNF fluctuates over time depending on the conditions in theater as determined by the commanders on the ground; the current U.S. contribution to the MNF is approximately 152,035 U.S. military personnel.

In furtherance of our efforts against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the United States, its friends and allies, and our forces abroad, the United States continues to work with friends and allies in areas around the globe. These efforts include the deployment of U.S. combat-equipped and combat-support forces to assist in enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies. United States combat-equipped and combat-support forces continue to be located in the Horn of Africa region.

In addition, the United States continues to conduct maritime interception operations on the high seas in the areas of responsibility of all of the geographic combatant commanders. These maritime operations have the responsibility to stop the movement, arming, or financing of international terrorists.

NATO-LED KOSOVO FORCE (KFOR)

As noted in previous reports regarding U.S. contributions in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo, the U.N. Security Council authorized Member States to establish KFOR in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 10, 1999.

The original mission of KFOR was to monitor, to verify, and, when necessary, to enforce compliance with the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and Serbia (formerly the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), while maintaining a safe and secure environment. Today, KFOR deters renewed hostilities and, with local authorities and international police, contributes to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment that facilitates the work of the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the European Union (EU)-led International Civilian Office, and the evolving EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX).

Currently, 25 NATO nations contribute to KFOR. Eight non-NATO countries also participate by providing military and other support personnel to KFOR. The U.S. contribution to KFOR is about 1,500 U.S. military personnel, or approximately 9 percent of KFOR's total strength of approximately 15,500 personnel.

The U.S. participating forces in KFOR have been assigned to the eastern region of Kosovo but also have operated in other areas of the country based on mission requirements. For U.S. KFOR forces, as for KFOR generally, helping to maintain a safe and secure environment remains the principal military task. The KFOR operates under NATO command and control and rules of engagement. The KFOR currently coordinates with and supports UNMIK within means and capabilities and has provided similar assurances of cooperation to EULEX. The KFOR provides a security presence in towns, villages, and the country-side; and organizes checkpoints and patrols in key areas to provide security, to protect all elements of the population living in Kosovo, and to help instill a feeling of confidence in all ethnic communities throughout Kosovo.

NATO continues periodically to conduct a formal review of KFOR's mission. These reviews provide a basis for assessing current force levels, future requirements, force structure, force reductions, and the eventual withdrawal of KFOR. NATO adopted the Joint Operations Area plan to regionalize and rationalize its force structure in the Balkans.

The UNMIK international police and Kosovo Police Service (KPS) have primary responsibility for public safety and policing throughout Kosovo. The UNMIK international police and KPS also have assumed responsibility for guarding some patrimonial sites and operating border crossings. The KFOR supports these police forces when requested and augments security in particularly sensitive areas or in response to particular threats as events on the ground dictate.

I have directed the participation of U.S. Armed Forces in all of these operations pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. Officials of my Administration and I communicate regularly with the leadership and other Members of Congress with regard to these deployments, and we will continue to do so.

Sincerely,

GEORGE W. BUSH

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AJC Alarmed by Latest IAEA Report on Iran's Nuclear Program

/PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- AJC is alarmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) latest report, which indicates that Iran has produced 630 kilograms of low-enriched uranium. According to nuclear physicists, this amount of low-enriched uranium is roughly sufficient to make one atomic bomb.

"The harsh reality is that Iran has defied repeated international demands and continued its enrichment program, widely believed to be for military purposes," said AJC Executive Director David A. Harris.

While additional steps are required to actually create the bomb, including further enrichment and design of the bomb itself, this development represents yet another ominous milestone in the Iranian effort to achieve nuclear weapons capability.

"This week's IAEA report on the Iranian nuclear program, coupled with earlier studies, should serve as a pressing wake-up call for the international community," said Harris. "It is high time for the UN Security Council, the European Union and key nations with ties to Iran to adopt further measures -- political, commercial and financial -- to ensure that Iran gets the clear message that 'it can't have its yellow cake and eat it, too.'"

Moreover, with nearly 4000 centrifuges at work to enrich uranium, and ambitions to increase that number rapidly, Iran is unquestionably seeking additional low-enriched uranium.

"The sanctions enacted to date, while laudable in their intent, have not yet had the desired impact," said Harris. "The international community must ratchet up the pressure, while leaving the door open to the diplomatic solution that Tehran has spurned for years. The stark alternative is a nuclear Iran, which would trigger a nuclear arms race among its neighbors and pose an unprecedented threat to regional and global security."

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